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Willingness to Pay: A Welfarist Reassessment 
Oren Bar-Gill† 
From a welfarist perspective, willingness to pay (WTP) is relevant 
only as a proxy for individual preferences or utilities. Much of the criticism 
levied against the WTP criterion can be understood as saying that WTP is 
a bad proxy for utility, or that WTP contains limited information about 
preferences. Specifically, critics of WTP claim wealth effects prevent it 
from serving as a good proxy for utility. I formalize and extend this critique 
by developing a methodology for quantifying the informational content of 
WTP.  
The informational content of WTP depends on how WTP is measured 
and applied. First, I distinguish between two types of policies: (i) policies 
that are not paid for by the individuals they affect and (ii) policies that are 
paid for by the individuals they affect. Second, I distinguish between two 
types of WTP measures: (i) individualized WTP and (ii) uniform, average 
WTP (like the value of a statistical life). When the cost of the policy is not 
borne by the affected individuals, individualized WTP has low informa-
tional content and increases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has 
higher informational content and reduces wealth disparity, at least in the 
case of universal benefits. Therefore, when possible, a uniform, average 
WTP should be preferred in this scenario. When the cost of the policy is 
borne by the affected individuals, individualized WTP has high informa-
tional content but increases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has 
lower informational content and indeterminate distributional implications. 
Here, the choice between individualized WTP and uniform, average WTP 
is more difficult. 
I briefly consider two extensions. The first involves time. I present a 
dynamic extension of the relationship between the informational content 
of WTP and the wealth distribution. The second extension emphasizes the 
effect of forward-looking rationality on the WTP measure. The question 
of rationality raises additional concerns about WTP-based policymaking. 
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Introduction 
Despite enduring criticism,1 the willingness-to-pay (WTP) criterion 
continues to exert substantial influence on policymaking, especially 
through the vehicle of cost-benefit analysis.2 Based on general Executive 
orders3 and implementing guidelines from the Office of Management and 
Budget,4 many government agencies, including the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA),5 the Department of Transportation (DOT),6 the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS),7 and the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC),8 rely on a WTP-based cost-benefit analysis in 
the rulemaking process.9 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 3, 16-19 (1975); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect 
a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980); Hanoch Dagan, Political Money, 8 ELECTION 
L.J. 349, 356 (2009); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Dun-
can Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(1981) [hereinafter Kennedy, A Critique]; Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the 
Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 465, 471-72 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Kennedy, Law-and-
Economics]; Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 227, 240 (1980); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649-1718 
(2018). 
 2. For a cost-benefit analysis in U.S. policymaking, see, for example, Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (requiring cost-benefit analysis in federal agencies). See also Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (2015) (holding that the EPA was required to consider cost against 
benefits before promulgating the regulatory scheme at issue). For the influence of cost-benefit 
analysis on policy-oriented research, see, for example, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 
2000); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008); Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Third-Six Questions (and Almost as Many 
Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (2014). 
 3. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
 4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 
18-20 (2003) (“‘Opportunity cost’ is the appropriate concept for valuing both benefits and costs. 
The principle of ‘willingness-to-pay’ (WTP) captures the notion of opportunity cost by measuring 
what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular benefit.”). 
 5. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES: 
MORTALITY RISK VALUATION ESTIMATES, at B-4 (2010). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE 2016: TREATMENT OF 
THE VALUE OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, 
at 1 (2016); U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., THE VALUE OF TRAVEL TIME SAVINGS: DEPARTMENTAL 
GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS REVISION 2, at 2 (2016) [hereinafter 
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., THE VALUE OF TRAVEL TIME SAVINGS]. 
 7. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VALUING TIME IN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK AND BEST PRACTICES, at 7-11 (2017) (stating that time used—a cost in HHS’s cost-
benefit analysis for a given set of regulation—is a function of wages, which are, in turn, a function 
of a worker’s willingness to accept). 
 8. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, COST-BENEFIT GUIDANCE UPDATE, at 16 
(2017) (“NRC utilizes the willingness to pay (WTP) method for calculating VSL [value of a statis-
tical life], consistent with other Federal agencies.”). 
 9. Many of the above examples are taken from Liscow, supra note 1. The WTP criterion 
is also invoked in tort law. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, Willingness to Pay, Death, 
Wealth, and Damages, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 45 (2011); Jennifer H. Arlen, Note, An Economic 
Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113 (1985). While my focus is 
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In this Essay, I use a welfarist framework to evaluate WTP-based pol-
icymaking and the critiques of WTP-based policymaking. I begin with the 
fundamental question: why use WTP at all? A welfarist cares about indi-
vidual preferences or utilities and how they are aggregated into a social 
welfare function, not about individuals’ WTP. The answer is simple: we 
cannot directly observe preferences or utilities, and so we use WTP as a 
proxy for utility. The idea is that WTP contains important information 
about preferences and utility.10 Much of the criticism levied against the 
WTP criterion can be understood as saying that WTP is a bad proxy for 
utility, or that WTP contains limited information about preferences.11 
A. The Informational Content of WTP 
The main goal of this Essay is to explore the conditions under which 
WTP can serve as a good proxy for utility. A major criticism of WTP is that 
wealth effects prevent WTP from serving as a good proxy for utility. I for-
malize this critique and extend it. In particular, I analyze the effects of the 
distribution of wealth in society on the informational content of WTP. The 
basic claim is that WTP contains more information about preferences, and 
thus serves as a better proxy for utility, when the distribution of wealth is 
more equal. Conversely, in a society with great wealth disparities, there is 
a greater risk that WTP will be a poor proxy for utility.12 Whether this risk 
is realized critically depends on how WTP is measured and applied. 
I develop a methodology for quantifying the informational content of 
WTP. This methodology requires the specification of a functional relation-
ship between wealth and utility that captures the decreasing marginal util-
ity from money. More fundamentally, this functional relationship is as-
sumed to be common across individuals (representing common personal 
preferences). This assumption supports cardinal and interpersonally com-
parable utilities.13 The power of this methodology is demonstrated using a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
on regulatory decision making, some of the analysis may also be relevant to tort law. In some 
cases, for example, when a legal policy removes an existing entitlement, willingness to accept 
(WTA) may be more appropriate than WTP. The analysis in this paper would apply for policy-
making based on WTA, although the WTA measure should be less sensitive to wealth. 
 10. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 50 (1995) (dis-
cussing demand theory and how demand curves aggregate WTP across all consumers). 
 11. I use the terms “preferences,” “utility,” and “social welfare function” as they are de-
fined in microeconomics and welfare economics. See, e.g., id. at 3-14 (on preferences and utility), 
789-90 (on social welfare). A utility function represents a preference ordering, and a social welfare 
function is an aggregation of individuals’ utility functions. Accordingly, my focus is on the prefer-
ence-satisfaction version of welfarism, although at least some of the arguments apply to other ver-
sions of welfarism. For an explanation of the different versions of welfarism, see, for example, 
MATTHEW D. ADLER, MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE: AN INTRODUCTION 10-11 (2019). 
 12. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 11, at 35 (“CBA’s valuations are skewed by the dimin-
ishing marginal well-being impact of money.”). 
 13. The proposed methodology is closely related to the distributional weights approach 
in cost-benefit analysis. For an excellent exposition to this approach, see Matthew D. Adler, Ben-
efit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 264 
(2016).  
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particular functional relationship that is borrowed from other applications 
in the economic literature and supported by data. My purpose, however, is 
not to defend any specific function but rather to show how the distortion 
caused by WTP-based policymaking can be quantified given a specified 
functional relationship between wealth and utility. 
As mentioned above, the informational content of WTP depends on 
how it is measured and on the policy choices that WTP is called upon to 
resolve. I start with a taxonomy that identifies and distinguishes the rele-
vant scenarios.14 
1. WTP Measures and Uses: A Taxonomy 
When considering the effects of WTP on policymaking, it is important 
to distinguish between two types of policies based on who bears the cost of 
the policy: (1) policies that are paid for not by the individuals they affect 
but by general funding sources (like tax revenues) and (2) policies that are 
paid for by the individuals they affect. Policies that improve the country’s 
schools (e.g., by hiring more teachers, improving teacher training, upgrad-
ing school buildings, or deploying new technology) are examples of the first 
type. These policies are paid for not by the students or their families but 
by general tax revenues. Policies that improve car safety (e.g., by mandat-
ing features like airbags, antilock braking systems (ABS), or rearview cam-
eras) are examples of the second type. Regulation that mandates such fea-
tures will increase the cost of manufacturing cars, and this cost will be 
passed on (at least in part) to car buyers. Therefore, car owners who ben-
efit from the policy by driving safer cars also bear the cost of the policy.15  
It is also important to distinguish between two types of WTP 
measures: individualized WTP and uniform, average WTP. Individualized 
WTP measures the benefit of a policy by eliciting the WTP of the individ-
uals who are affected by the policy. Consider a policy that reduces the mor-
tality risk of individuals in a certain geographic location (e.g., by improving 
air quality in the region). An individualized WTP asks the affected individ-
uals how much they would pay for the reduction in mortality risk. Uniform, 
average WTP measures a universal benefit by eliciting and aggregating the 
WTP of all individuals. Reducing mortality risk is an example of a universal 
benefit. Some policies reduce mortality risk for one group of individuals, 
whereas other policies reduce mortality risk for a different group of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 14. Cf. id. at 275-77. Adler’s distinction between different “cost incidence” is similar to 
my distinction between policies that are paid for by the individuals they affect and policies that 
are not paid for by the individuals they affect. Also, Adler’s distinction between differentiated 
values and population-average values parallels my distinction between individualized WTP and 
uniform, average WTP. 
 15. Policies that are paid for by the affected individuals and policies that are not paid for 
by the affected individuals mark two polar extremes. Between these extremes lie many policies 
that are partially funded by the affected individuals. For example, students and their families may 
pay, at least partially, for higher-quality schools through school attendance fees and higher prop-
erty taxes. And car manufacturers may not be able to pass all of the increased cost to car buyers.  
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individuals. Policymakers can elicit WTP for a reduction in mortality risk 
from all individuals, regardless of any specific policy. Policymakers can 
then calculate the average WTP across the population and use this average 
figure as a uniform WTP whenever a policy affects mortality risk. Return-
ing to the policy that reduces mortality risk in a certain geographic loca-
tion, this approach would use the uniform, average WTP rather than elicit 
WTP from the individuals in that geographic location. 
Individualized WTP measures, or at least WTP measures that are dis-
aggregated by income groups, are sometimes used in practice.16 For exam-
ple, DOT uses a WTP-based measure of time called Value of Time Travel 
Savings (VTTS). The VTTS does not have a single, uniform value; rather, 
it is higher for air and high-speed rail travel and lower for intercity travel 
(buses). DOT has adopted an explicitly income-based justification for the 
different VTTS values: users of air and high-speed rail are richer than those 
who ride the bus and are thus willing to pay more for time saved.17 In most 
cases, however, policymakers use a uniform, average (or median) WTP ag-
gregated across the entire population, even when the policy affects only a 
subset of the population. Most prominently, the value of a statistical life 
(VSL), routinely used in the cost-benefit analysis of regulations that affect 
mortality risk, is a uniform, population-wide figure.18 
The preceding distinctions are summarized in the following table. I 
will show how each scenario affects the informational content of WTP.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 16. See Liscow, supra note 1; see also ADLER, supra note 11, at 199 (noting that “text-
book” cost-benefit analysis uses individualized monetary equivalents); Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing 
Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385 (2004) (arguing for the use of disaggregated 
WTP values). 
 17. See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., THE VALUE OF TRAVEL TIME SAVINGS, supra note 6, at 7. 
 18. For an excellent account of how VSL figures are derived and how they are used in 
policymaking, see Sunstein, supra note 16, at 396-404. There are two sources for VSL figures. The 
first is average responses from contingent valuation studies. The second, and more influential, 
source is market evidence of the price of safety from labor and consumer markets (e.g., the wage 
premium for a job that entails a certain mortality risk). Id. The market value of mortality risk can 
be thought of as an average WTP figure if market participants in a given market or across different 
markets used to derive the uniform VSL are representative of the general population. Note that 
market wages, for example, are affected by the risk premium demanded by the marginal employee, 
not by the average employee. If marginal employees and marginal consumers across different 
markets are systematically poorer, then the VSL is not an average WTP figure. When the VSL or, 
more generally, WTP is derived from market transactions, there might be two distortions: (1) mar-
ket failures might bias attempts to derive WTP information from market prices and (2) WTP for 
a benefit provided through the market may be different from WTP for the same benefit provided 
by the government. These and other distortions in the measurement of WTP are not addressed in 
this paper. 
 19. The four scenarios in Table 1 are theoretical archetypes. Real-world policymaking is 
often a hybrid of two or more scenarios. 
Willingness to Pay: A Welfarist Reassessment 
509 
Table 1. Different Policy Types and Different WTP Measures 
 
  What type of WTP measure is 
used? 
 






Who pays for 
the policy? 
Not those affected 
by the policy 
 
Scenario I Scenario II 
Those affected by 
the policy 
 
Scenario III Scenario IV 
2. Policies that Are Not Paid for by the Affected Individuals 
(Scenarios I and II) 
When WTP is used to evaluate policies that are not paid for by the 
affected individuals, the main concern is the informational content of indi-
vidualized WTP (Scenario I). In this context, informational content can be 
conceptualized as follows: a WTP measure is perfectly informative when it 
supports the adoption of Policy A rather than Policy B if and only if Policy 
A creates greater utility than Policy B. The informational content of the 
WTP measure goes down when it supports Policy A, even though Policy B 
creates greater utility. In particular, an individualized WTP would support 
a Policy A that benefits a rich Individual A, even though Policy B creates 
greater utility for a poor Individual B. The methodology developed in this 
Essay allows us to quantify this distortion by calculating the maximal ratio 
between the utility that would have been created by the rejected Policy B 
and the utility that is created by the adopted Policy A. Consider an illus-
trative example based on U.S. data.20 If Individual A’s wealth is in the sev-
entieth percentile and Individual B’s wealth is in the thirtieth percentile 
(which means that Individual A’s wealth is 14.7 times greater than Individ-
ual B’s wealth), then a WTP-based assessment will support Individual A’s 
preferred policy, Policy A, even when the benefit provided by Individual 
B’s preferred policy, Policy B, is 14.29 to 200 times greater, depending on 
the scale of the policies considered.  
In some cases, the use of uniform, average WTP figures (Scenario II) 
instead of individualized WTP figures (Scenario I) reduces, or even elimi-
nates, the distortion caused by wealth disparity. Consider Policy A, which 
benefits the rich and saves 1,000 (statistical) lives, and Policy B, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 20. See infra Section II.A.2 for the source of these data as well as additional detail. 
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benefits the poor and saves 2,000 (statistical) lives. With individualized 
WTP, the less effective Policy A might be preferred. But if a uniform, av-
erage WTP is used for measuring reduction in mortality risk (VSL), then 
the more effective Policy B will be preferred. The uniform, average WTP 
has greater informational content than the individualized WTP.21 But uni-
form, average WTP measures do not always solve (or mitigate) the wealth 
disparity problem, and they do not always increase the informational con-
tent of WTP. A uniform, average WTP is informative only when measuring 
a universal benefit, like reduction in mortality risk, that everyone cares 
about. 
3. Policies that Are Paid for by the Affected Individuals (Scenarios 
III and IV) 
When WTP is used to evaluate policies that are paid for by the af-
fected individuals, the main concern is the informational content of uni-
form, average WTP (Scenario IV). It is useful to begin with the individual-
ized WTP and explain why the individualized measure has high 
informational content in this scenario. The poor are willing to pay less than 
the rich for a policy that would create the same (or greater) utility because 
the poor have other, high-utility uses for the little money they have (e.g., 
paying rent and buying food). On the other hand, the rich have more 
money and lower-utility uses for their marginal dollars (think of a billion-
aire buying her tenth yacht). Individualized WTP thus balances the utility 
created by the policy (the benefit side) against the utility from alternative 
uses (the cost side). Since both benefits and costs are important, individu-
alized WTP is normatively appealing. When the cost of implementing the 
policies is borne by the individuals who are affected by these policies, 
adopting a policy that affects the rich and rejecting an equal-benefit policy 
that affects the poor is a feature, not a bug. This outcome reflects the high 
informational content of individualized WTP. 
When policymakers replace individualized WTP with a uniform, av-
erage WTP, informational content might be lost. Consider a Policy B that 
reduces mortality risk for the poor Individual B, for example, a regulation 
that forces manufacturers to add a certain safety feature to a product that 
is purchased mainly by the poor and that would thus increase the price of 
the product. While Individual B clearly benefits from the reduction in mor-
tality risk, Individual B might not be willing to pay the higher price for the 
safer product if this reduction is not very high. In this case, with individu-
alized WTP, Policy B would be rejected. But, if policymakers use the 
higher, average WTP for a reduction in mortality risk, then Policy B might 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 21. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1122-23 (2000) (explaining that “a constant 
figure for the monetized value of life” is one way to address the distortion caused by wealth dis-
parity). 
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be adopted. Or consider a Policy A that reduces mortality risk for the rich 
Individual A; for example, imagine the safety feature is now added to a 
product that is purchased mainly by the rich. Individual A may be happy 
to pay the higher price for the safer product. Thus, with individualized 
WTP, Policy A would be adopted. But if policymakers use the lower, av-
erage WTP for a reduction in mortality risk, then Policy A might be re-
jected.  
These distortions have been identified in the literature.22 I quantify 
them by showing how greater wealth disparity increases the range of wel-
fare-reducing policies that would be adopted if a uniform, average WTP 
were used. A larger distortion means lower informational content of the 
WTP measure. Extending the example described above, where Individual 
A’s wealth is in the seventieth percentile, and Individual B’s wealth is in 
the thirtieth percentile, I show that with a uniform, average WTP, the pol-
icymaker might adopt a welfare-reducing policy that will force Individual 
B to pay up to 9.38 times as much as the benefit is actually worth to him, 
or up to 838% more than he is willing to pay for the policy. Similarly, the 
policymaker might fail to adopt a policy that costs much less than what 
Individual A would be willing to pay for the policy. 
4. Summary 
When the cost of the policy is not borne by the affected individuals, 
uniform, average WTP has more informational content than individualized 
WTP. In contrast, when the cost of the policy is borne by the affected indi-
viduals, uniform, average WTP has less informational content than indi-
vidualized WTP. In both scenarios, however, when WTP—either individ-
ualized or average—has limited informational content, this informational 
content decreases as wealth disparity increases.  
These results suggest a previously underappreciated social cost of 
wealth disparity and present a novel challenge for WTP-based policymak-
ing. If greater inequality reduces the informational content of the WTP 
measure, then a policy that exacerbates wealth disparities will make it 
harder to identify welfare-enhancing policies in the future. From a welfar-
ist perspective, the main justification for using WTP is the information it 
carries about preferences and utility. If WTP-based policymaking exacer-
bates wealth disparities, then the mere use of WTP in policymaking under-
mines the justification of using WTP in policymaking. WTP-based policy-
making might become self-defeating. This raises a key question: when does 
WTP-based policymaking exacerbate wealth disparities? 
When the cost of the policy is not borne by the affected individuals, 
greater wealth disparity reduces the informational content of individual-
ized WTP. In this scenario, WTP distorts policymaking in a particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 22. See Sunstein, supra note 16. 
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direction, benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor.23 Using a uniform, 
average WTP can reduce, or even eliminate, the distortion when the only 
relevant benefit of the considered policy is a universal benefit, like a re-
duction in mortality risk. Moreover, in the important case of universal ben-
efits, a uniform, average WTP can support progressive redistribution (or 
at least avoid the regressive redistribution of individualized WTP), regard-
less of informational content. Consider a policy that saves many (statisti-
cal) lives of poor individuals but costs billions to implement. Using the 
poor individuals’ WTP, the policymaker might conclude that the benefit 
does not justify the cost and reject the policy. Using the higher, average 
WTP, the same policy may be adopted. (Using the average WTP and 
adopting the policy is especially good for the poor if the implementation 
costs are paid for by general taxes and the poor pay less in taxes.) Now 
consider a policy that saves many (statistical) lives of rich individuals. Us-
ing the high WTP of the rich, the policy would be adopted, despite high 
implementation costs. The same policy may be rejected if we use the lower, 
average WTP. 
When the cost of the policy is borne by the affected individuals, indi-
vidualized WTP has high informational content. When considering policies 
that affect the poor, individualized WTP does not force the poor to pay 
more than they can for a benefit. When considering policies that affect the 
rich, individualized WTP supports high-cost policies that create even 
higher benefits. The high informational content, however, does not pre-
vent individualized WTP from supporting policy choices that increase 
wealth disparity. When the cost of the policy is borne by the affected indi-
viduals, a uniform, average WTP has lower informational content. It harms 
both the rich and the poor, with indeterminate distributional implications. 
To summarize, when the cost of the policy is not borne by the affected 
individuals, individualized WTP has low informational content and in-
creases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has higher informational 
content and reduces wealth disparity, at least in the case of universal ben-
efits. Therefore, when possible, a uniform, average WTP should be pre-
ferred in this scenario. When the cost of the policy is borne by the affected 
individuals, individualized WTP has high informational content but in-
creases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has lower informational 
content and indeterminate distributional implications. Here, the choice be-
tween individualized WTP and uniform, average WTP is more difficult. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 23. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 12, at 34 (providing an example in which the wealthier 
group, as opposed to a poorer group, is willing to pay more for medical treatment and therefore 
receives that treatment from the government); Baker, supra note 1, at 9 (“As a general matter, the 
rich are favored . . . to the extent that the rich own a disproportionate share of the productive 
assets, or more strictly, to the extent that the rich are more likely to be willing and able to buy a 
right for productive use.”); Bebchuk, supra note 1; Dworkin, supra note 1, at 199-200; Kennedy, 
A Critique, supra note 1; Kennedy, Law-and-Economics, supra note 1; Liscow, supra note 1, at 
1652 (“Because the rich have greater wealth, the view goes, they will tend to have a greater will-
ingness to pay, and therefore policymakers maximizing efficiency will choose policies that benefit 
the rich over the poor . . . .”). 
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The analysis provides further justification for the common use of uniform, 
average WTP measures, but only when the cost of the policy is not borne 
by the affected individuals.24 
B. Time and Rationality 
Two extensions are briefly considered. The first involves time. I pre-
sent a dynamic extension of the relationship between the informational 
content of WTP and the wealth distribution. Since WTP is affected by 
wealth, the initial wealth distribution will affect the policies that a WTP-
based analysis prescribes. These chosen policies will then change the dis-
tribution of wealth, which will change WTP and lead to further policy 
change. This further policy change will again affect the distribution of 
wealth. Etc. Through this dynamic, inequality can increase over time.25 (In-
equality can also decrease over time if only uniform, average WTP is used.) 
A standard critique of WTP-based policymaking is that the chosen 
policy depends on the initial distribution of wealth.26 The dynamic exten-
sion strengthens this critique. The initial wealth distribution affects not 
only the current policy choice but also many future policy choices. In addi-
tion, the dynamic extension forces us to rethink the WTP for the initial 
policy. Since the initial policy will affect, through the evolving wealth dis-
tribution, many future policies, the stakes are higher, and thus WTP for the 
initial policy will be higher. Indeed, individuals would borrow against fu-
ture wealth to increase WTP and secure their favored initial policy.  
The second extension emphasizes the effect of forward-looking ra-
tionality on the WTP measure. Consider the standard WTP question: “how 
much are you willing to pay for Policy X?” For a rational individual, this 
question would elicit a response that is sensitive to changes in the wealth 
distribution brought about by the policy in the short term and in the long 
term (incorporating the dynamic extension). On the other hand, a myopic 
individual will consider only the immediate effects of the policy, ignoring 
its implications for the wealth distribution and for future policy debates. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 24. While my focus is on identifying and quantifying the distortion caused by wealth dis-
parity, the proposed analytical framework can also be used to correct for the wealth disparity, or 
to derive a wealth-adjusted WTP that policymakers can apply. When the cost of the policy is not 
borne by the affected individuals and we have an empirically assessed individualized WTP of a 
poor individual or a rich individual, I show how to derive the WTP of an individual with median 
wealth for the same policy or benefit. The proposed wealth adjustment is closely related to the 
distributional weights approach. See Adler, supra note 13. When the cost of the policy is borne by 
the affected individuals, the problem is with the uniform, average WTP; it can be corrected by 
shifting to an individualized WTP, which has higher informational content. 
 25. There are other reasons why the rich get richer. See, e.g., DANIEL RIGNEY, THE 
MATTHEW EFFECT: HOW ADVANTAGE BEGETS FURTHER ADVANTAGE (2010) (suggesting that 
economic Matthew effects occur, among other reasons, due to inheritance, compounding interest, 
promotion and compensation dynamics, and monopoly and oligopoly effects); Liscow, supra note 
1. 
 26. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1; Kennedy, A Critique, supra note 1. 
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Therefore, the question of rationality raises additional concerns about 
WTP-based policymaking.27 
* * * 
The remainder of the Essay is organized as follows: Part I lays out the 
framework of analysis. Part II analyzes and quantifies the effects of the 
wealth distribution on the informational content of WTP when the cost of 
the policy is not borne by the affected individuals. Part III shifts the focus 
to scenarios where the cost of the policy is borne by the affected individu-
als. Part IV briefly discusses the two extensions concerning time and ra-
tionality.  
I. Framework of Analysis 
A. Setup 
Consider a society with two individuals: Individual A and Individual 
B (or, equivalently, a society with two homogeneous groups: Group A and 
Group B). The parties’ utilities are denoted by 𝑢( and 𝑢), and their wealth 
is denoted by 𝜔( and 𝜔). I assume, without loss of generality, that 𝜔( >
𝜔) > 0. Specifically, let 𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔) with 𝛾 > 1. Let 𝜔. ≡ (𝜔(,𝜔)) denote the 
vector of wealth values.28 The social welfare function is 𝑊(𝑢(, 𝑢)).  
Denote the status quo policy by 𝑃5. In the status quo, individual utili-
ties are 𝑢(5 and 𝑢)5 , and social welfare is 𝑊5 = 𝑊(𝑢(5, 𝑢)5). A new policy, 𝑃6, 
is being considered. This new policy increases Individual A’s utility by ∆𝑢( 
and Individual B’s utility by ∆𝑢). For simplicity, we assume that ∆𝑢( ≥ 0, 
and ∆𝑢) ≥ 0. Let ∆𝑢( = 𝛿∆𝑢) with 𝛿 ≥ 0.29 The utility changes, ∆𝑢( and 
∆𝑢), reflect the benefits from 𝑃6 (e.g., cleaner air or better schools). If the 
individuals need to pay for 𝑃6 (e.g., through higher taxes or higher product 
prices), then these costs will also affect the individuals’ utilities under 𝑃6. 
We thus have 𝑢(6 = 𝑢(5 + ∆𝑢(, and 𝑢)6 = 𝑢)5 + ∆𝑢). Under 𝑃6, social welfare 
will be 𝑊6 = 𝑊(𝑢(6, 𝑢)6 ). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 27. For a different critique of WTP-based policymaking that is also based on bounded 
rationality, see Sunstein, supra note 16, at 403, 411, 427-28. 
 28. Utility is affected by the individual’s wealth and by the overall distribution of wealth. 
If I have more wealth, then (other things being equal) I can consume more and thus increase my 
utility. But if everyone’s wealth increases, then prices may increase such that my personal in-
creased wealth does not translate into more consumption. Also, an individual may independently 
care about how her own wealth compares to that of others in the population. We thus have 
𝑢((𝜔(,𝜔.) and 𝑢)(𝜔),𝜔.). In the examples studied infra Parts II and III, we define wealth, 𝜔;, in 
relation to the average or median wealth level, rather than in absolute dollar terms, thus account-
ing for these relative wealth effects.  
 29. The policy 𝑃6 affects utilities through two channels: (1) the direct channel whereby the 
policy brings about a new state of the world that is better for at least some individuals (e.g., shorter 
wait times at airports that increase the utilities of travelers) and (2) the indirect, wealth channel 
whereby the policy changes the distribution of wealth, which then affects utilities. For example, if 
I can get to the airport an hour later, then I can stay at work an hour longer and earn more money, 
which I can then spend on consumption. (Some policies directly affect the distribution of wealth, 
e.g., policies that change the level of taxes or subsidies and policies that grant monopoly power 
through intellectual property rights or otherwise.) 
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The new policy, 𝑃6, can affect Individual A or Individual B, but not 
both. Let Policy A be a policy that affects only Individual A, and let Policy 
B be a policy that affects only Individual B. Specifically, Policy A increases 
Individual A’s utility by ∆𝑢(, and Policy B increases Individual B’s utility 
by ∆𝑢). The idea is to distinguish between policies that affect the rich (In-
dividual A) and policies that affect the poor (Individual B). Of course, 
there are also policies that affect both the rich Individual A and the poor 
Individual B. But, for present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on the two 
targeted policies: Policy A and Policy B. The analysis can be extended to 
account for hybrid policies.30 
B. Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
Individual A is willing to pay 𝑚( for a policy that increases her utility 
by ∆𝑢(, and Individual B is willing to pay 𝑚) for a policy that increases his 
utility by ∆𝑢). We thus have 𝑚((∆𝑢(,𝜔() and 𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)). Since ∆𝑢( ≥ 0, 
and ∆𝑢) ≥ 0, we have 𝑚((∆𝑢(,𝜔() ≥ 0, and 𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)) ≥ 0.31 Let 𝑣(𝜔) 
represent universal utility from wealth, namely, from purchasing a nu-
meraire good. We assume that 𝑣(𝜔) is defined on ℜ> and that 𝑣(0) = 0. 
We also assume decreasing marginal utility from wealth, or 𝑣′(𝜔) > 0, and 
𝑣′′(𝜔) < 0. An individual 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} with wealth 𝜔; would divide this wealth 
between the policy change and the numeraire good. In particular, this in-
dividual’s WTP, 𝑚;, for a policy change that gives the individual ∆𝑢;, is 
implicitly defined by the following equation32:  
 
𝑣(𝜔;) − 𝑣(𝜔; −𝑚;) = ∆𝑢; (1) 
 
If 𝑣(𝜔;) < ∆𝑢;, then 𝑚; = 𝜔;. In this range, equation (1) does not have 
a solution; rather, WTP for the policy change is determined by the individ-
ual rationality (IR) constraint: 𝑚; ≤ 𝜔; (which states that the individual 
would never be able to pay more than 𝜔;). If the utility from the policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 30. A more general model would define a continuous range of policies with Policy A, 
which affects only Individual A, at one end of the range and Policy B, which affects only individual 
B, at the other end of the range. Specifically, let 𝜙 ∈ [0,1] and define a Policy 𝜙 that creates utility 
∆𝑢((𝜙) for Individual A and utility ∆𝑢)(𝜙) for Individual B. Assume that ∆𝑢((𝜙 = 0) = 0, 
∆𝑢(′(𝜙) > 0, and ∆𝑢(′′(𝜙) ≤ 0, and assume that ∆𝑢)(𝜙 = 1) = 0, ∆𝑢)′(𝜙) < 0, and ∆𝑢)′′(𝜙) ≤ 0. 
The policymaker needs to choose which Policy, 𝜙, to adopt (i.e., the policymaker needs to choose 
the optimal value of 𝜙). With a utilitarian social welfare function, the policymaker will choose 𝜙 
to maximize ∆𝑢((𝜙) + ∆𝑢)(𝜙).  
 31. If a policy increases individual i’s wealth and the individual can borrow against his 
future wealth, then individual i’s WTP for the policy will reflect the increased wealth. Indeed, 𝜔; 
should reflect the individual’s future wealth. Cf. Kronman, supra note 1, at 240-41. 
 32. This formulation assumes that the individual’s overall utility is equal to the sum of 
her utility from the numeraire good, 𝑣(𝜔;), and her utility from the policy, ∆𝑢;. In a more general 
formulation, we would denote utility as 𝑈(𝜔;, 𝑃), which is a general function of wealth and policy. 
And the WTP, 𝑚;, for a policy change from 𝑃5 to 𝑃6 would be implicitly defined by 𝑈(𝜔;, 𝑃5) =
𝑈(𝜔; − 𝑚;, 𝑃6). Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1037, 1040 (2000). 
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change exceeds the utility obtained when the individual’s wealth is spent 
entirely on the numeraire good, the individual would be willing to pay her 
entire wealth for the policy change.33  
If 𝑣(𝜔;) ≥ ∆𝑢;, then equation (1) has a solution, and WTP for the pol-
icy change, 𝑚;, is implicitly defined by equation (1). If the utility from the 
policy change is smaller than the utility obtained when the individual’s 
wealth is spent entirely on the numeraire good, then we get an interior so-
lution that is implicitly defined by equation (1).  
WTP is an increasing function of the utility change and of wealth since 
MNO
M∆PO
≥ 0, and MNO
MQO











There are two types of WTP measures: individualized WTP and uni-
form, average WTP. In theory, we need to consider the individualized 
WTP, or the WTP of the individuals who are affected by the policy. This 
means that we assess the WTP of the rich Individual A, 𝑚((∆𝑢(,𝜔(), when 
considering Policy A, and we assess the WTP of the poor Individual B, 
𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)), when considering Policy B. This individualized measure is 
sometimes used in practice (or at least WTP measures that are disaggre-
gated by income groups). 
In most cases, however, policymakers use a uniform, average (or me-
dian) WTP aggregated across the entire population, even when the policy 
affects only a subset of the population. Most prominently, the value of a 
statistical life (VSL), which is routinely used in the cost-benefit analysis of 
regulations that affect mortality risk, is a uniform, population-wide figure. 
The VSL is not calculated separately for each affected individual or even 
for each income group. Rather, a single VSL figure is used, averaging 
across the WTP of the rich and the poor (i.e., the WTP for a reduction in 
mortality risk). The VSL case represents a universal benefit—reduction in 
mortality risk—that, at least on an abstract level, provides a similar in-
crease in utility for both the rich and the poor: ∆𝑢( = ∆𝑢) ≡ ∆𝑢. If Individ-
ual A’s WTP for this benefit is 𝑚((∆𝑢,𝜔(), and Individual B’s WTP for the 
same benefit is 𝑚)(∆𝑢,𝜔)), then the average WTP is: 
𝑚.(∆𝑢) = 6
V
W𝑚((∆𝑢, 𝜔() +𝑚)(∆𝑢, 𝜔))X.  
Such a uniform, average WTP will be used when assessing Policy A, which 
affects only Individual A, or Policy B, which affects only Individual B. 
C. Policy Effects and Policy Choices 
Policymakers face different types of policy choices. In Case 1, the pol-
icymaker needs to decide whether to adopt a specific policy. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 33. More realistically, the maximum amount that an individual would be willing to pay 
for the policy change is not the individual’s entire wealth, but rather it would be her entire wealth 
minus a certain amount that is needed to cover basic expenses (like housing, food, clothing, etc.).  
Willingness to Pay: A Welfarist Reassessment 
517 
considered policy can be a policy that affects only the rich Individual A 
(Policy A) or a policy that affects only the poor Individual B (Policy B). If 
policymaking is based on WTP, then Policy A will be adopted if and only 
if 𝑚( exceeds the cost of the policy, and Policy B will be adopted if and 
only if 𝑚) exceeds the cost of the policy. In Case 2, the policymaker needs 
to choose between different policies with identical costs that are funded 
from the same source (e.g., general tax revenues). Here, I assume the pol-
icymaker must choose one policy from a list of proposed policies. The list 
may include policies that affect only the rich Individual A and policies that 
affect only the poor Individual B.34 If policymaking is based on WTP, the 
policymaker will choose the policy with the highest WTP. Specifically, if 
the policymaker is choosing between Policy A and Policy B, then Policy A 
will be chosen if 𝑚( > 𝑚), and Policy B will be chosen if 𝑚) > 𝑚(. (If 
𝑚( = 𝑚), then either policy can be chosen.) 
D. The Informational Content of WTP 
In a welfarist framework, the policymaker cares about preferences 
and utilities. An individual’s WTP is relevant only to the extent that it con-
tains information about that individual’s utility. A perfectly informative 
measure will prefer Policy A over Policy B only when Policy A creates 
more utility for Individual A than Policy B creates for Individual B. An 
imperfectly informative measure might prefer Policy A, even when it cre-
ates less utility. If WTP were perfectly informative, then 𝑚(	would be 
greater than 𝑚) only when ∆𝑢( > ∆𝑢). With an imperfectly informative 
WTP, we get a distortion: 𝑚( > 𝑚), even though ∆𝑢( < ∆𝑢). (The preced-
ing analysis may seem utilitarian, not just welfarist, but it isn’t. Informa-
tional content is only one aspect of an overall welfare assessment. For ex-
ample, with an egalitarian social welfare function, Policy B may be 
preferred, even if ∆𝑢( > ∆𝑢) as perfectly indicated by 𝑚( > 𝑚).) 
We formalize the notion of informational content by defining and 
measuring the distortion caused by an imperfectly informative measure 
like WTP. Policy A should be chosen if and only if ∆𝑢( > ∆𝑢), or if and 
only if 𝛿 > 1 (recall that ∆𝑢( = 𝛿∆𝑢)). When WTP is imperfectly informa-
tive, there will be a threshold, 𝛿Z < 1, such that for 𝛿 ∈ W𝛿Z, 1X, WTP-based 
policymaking leads us astray: 𝑚( > 𝑚), even though ∆𝑢( < ∆𝑢). The 
threshold, 𝛿Z, is implicitly defined by 𝑚(W∆𝑢( = 𝛿Z∆𝑢),𝜔(X =
𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)).35 Individual A is willing to pay more for Policy A than 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 34. This type of policy choice can be motivated by a budget constraint that allows the 
policymaker to choose only one policy, especially when we are considering policies that are not 
paid for by the individuals who benefit from the policy. This type of policy choice can also be 
motivated by a notion of regulatory burden that limits the number of policies that can be adopted.  
 35. Since 𝜔( > 𝜔), and 
MNO
MQO




≥ 0, there is a threshold value, 𝛿Z < 1, such that 𝑚(W𝛿Z∆𝑢),𝜔(X =
𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)). 
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Individual B is willing to pay for Policy B as long as ∆𝑢( > 𝛿Z∆𝑢). The dis-
tortion, 𝐷, caused by the wealth disparity, or the maximal difference be-
tween ∆𝑢) and ∆𝑢( (relative to ∆𝑢)) for which Policy A will still be wrongly 








= 1 − 𝛿Z (2) 
 
Another measure of the distortion is 1 𝛿Z⁄ . WTP-based policymaking 
will prescribe policies that produce utility 1 𝛿Z⁄  times smaller than the alter-
native. With both measures, 1 − 𝛿Z and 1 𝛿Z⁄ , the distortion increases when 
𝛿Z decreases. And, since a smaller distortion means larger informational 
content, we can measure the informational content of the WTP measure 
by using 𝛿Z. 
This methodology for conceptualizing and quantifying the distortion 
caused by the WTP measure applies in both Case 1 and Case 2. In Case 1, 
each policy is evaluated independently, comparing the benefit from the 
policy as measured by WTP to the cost of the policy. With a perfectly in-
formative measure, if Policy B, which creates utility ∆𝑢), is rejected, then 
Policy A, which creates a smaller utility, ∆𝑢(, will also be rejected. With an 
imperfectly informative WTP, Policy A might be adopted when Policy B is 
rejected, even when the utility created by Policy A is 1 𝛿Z⁄  times smaller. In 
Case 2, the policymaker chooses between Policy A and Policy B. With a 
perfectly informative measure, Policy A will never be chosen if it creates 
less utility than Policy B. With an imperfectly informative WTP, Policy A 
might be chosen over Policy B, even when the utility created by Policy A 
is 1 𝛿Z⁄  times smaller. 
There is an alternative methodology for evaluating the distortion 
caused by an imperfectly informative WTP. Let Policy A and Policy B be 
two policies that create the same benefit, ∆𝑢. Consider the difference be-
tween Individual A’s WTP for Policy A, 𝑚((∆𝑢,𝜔(), and Individual B’s 
WTP for Policy B, 𝑚)(∆𝑢, 𝜔)). This difference represents a range of poli-
cies with a cost, 𝑐 ∈ [𝑚)(∆𝑢, 𝜔)),𝑚((∆𝑢, 𝜔()X, that will be adopted when 
they benefit the rich, but not when the same benefit is enjoyed by the poor. 
In percentage terms, the distortion is as follows:  
 
𝐷 =




A variation on this alternative measure proves especially useful when 
we consider the informational content of a uniform, average WTP measure 
in scenarios where policies are paid for by the affected individuals. A uni-
form, average WTP is used when the policy creates a common benefit, ∆𝑢, 
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like a reduction in mortality rate. The distortion occurs when a poor Indi-
vidual B who is willing to pay 𝑚)(∆𝑢,𝜔)) for the benefit is forced to pay 
the higher, average WTP, 𝑚. = 6
V
[𝑚((∆𝑢,𝜔() + 𝑚)(∆𝑢,𝜔))]. This distor-










− 1` (4) 
 
A parallel distortion occurs when a rich Individual A who is willing to 
pay 𝑚((∆𝑢,𝜔() for the benefit is denied this benefit because the policy-












II. Policies that Are Not Paid for by the Affected Individuals 
I begin by considering policies that are not paid for by the affected 
individuals (e.g., policies that are funded by general tax revenues). Section 
II.A focuses on individualized WTP and studies the relationship between 
informational content and wealth disparity. Section II.B focuses on uni-
form, average WTP and shows that this measure reduces the distortion 
caused by wealth disparity. 
A. Individualized WTP 
1. Wealth Disparity and Informational Content 
If Individual A and Individual B have the same wealth, 𝜔( = 𝜔), then 
A’s WTP will exceed B’s WTP (i.e., 𝑚( ≥ 𝑚)) if and only if ∆𝑢( ≥ ∆𝑢).36 
The policy that creates the largest increase in utility will be chosen. How-
ever, the greater the wealth disparity, the more likely it is that 𝑚( > 𝑚), 
even though ∆𝑢( < ∆𝑢). The relationship between the degree of wealth 
disparity (𝛾) and the informational content of WTP (𝛿Z) is summarized in 
the following proposition: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 36 This result follows from the following: (i) given 𝜔( = 𝜔), under equation (1), ∆𝑢( = ∆𝑢) 
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Proposition 1: The threshold, 𝜹b, is decreasing in the degree of 
wealth disparity, 𝜸. Therefore, a less equal wealth distribution reduces 
the informational content of WTP. 
 
  Proof: The threshold 𝛿Z is implicitly defined by the equation 
𝑚(W∆𝑢( = 𝛿Z∆𝑢),𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔)X = 𝑚)(∆𝑢),𝜔)). Taking the derivative of 
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> 0. And we have Re
b
Rh
< 0. QED. 
 
To summarize, with individualized WTP measures, when wealth dis-
parity is large, the effect of wealth on WTP dilutes the effect of preferences 
on WTP, reducing the informational content of WTP. 
2. Example 
To get a better handle on the size of the distortion caused by WTP-
based policymaking, we add some additional structure to the model. We 
measure the utilities from the policy change in relation to the utility that 
Individual B would have received had she spent her entire wealth on the 
numeraire good. Specifically, we have ∆𝑢) = 𝛼𝑣(𝜔)) where 𝛼 ≥ 0. A 
higher 𝛼 represents policies with bigger impact, and a lower 𝛼 represents 
policies with smaller impact. For Individual A, using ∆𝑢( = 𝛿∆𝑢), we have 
∆𝑢( = 𝛿𝛼𝑣(𝜔)). Finally, we consider a specific functional form: 𝑣(𝜔) =
𝛽 ln𝜔, which has been commonly used in the literature.37 Based on subjec-
tive well-being (or happiness) data from Layard et al.,38 we set 𝛽 = mn so that 
𝑣(𝜔) = mn ln𝜔.
39  
With this additional structure, we derive the following closed-form ex-
pression for the threshold 𝛿Z40: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 37. See Daniel Bernoulli, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, in 5 
COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM IMPERIALIS PETROPOLITANAE 175 (1738), trans-
lated in Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, 22 
ECONOMETRICA 23 (1954); Hugh Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30 
ECON. J. 348 (1920); R. Layard et al., The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846 
(2008). Section C of the Appendix analyzes an alternative functional form and explores the sensi-
tivity of the quantified distortion to the chosen function. 
 38. Layard et al., supra note 37.  
 39. Setting 𝛽 = mn is also consistent with Viscusi and Masterman’s estimates of the income 
elasticity of the VSL. See W. Kip Viscusi & Clayton J. Masterman, Income Elasticities and Global 
Values of a Statistical Life, 8 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 226 (2017).  
 40. See infra Appendix Section A.  
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In Figure 1 (below), we graph the threshold 𝛿Z as a function of 𝛼 (the 






















Figure 1. The Threshold 𝛿Z as a Function of 𝛼 
 
Policy A should be chosen (or preferred over Policy B) in the area 
above the red line (i.e., when 𝛿 > 1). With WTP-based policymaking, Pol-
icy A will be chosen (or preferred over Policy B) in the area above the 
black line (i.e., when 𝛿 > 𝛿Z). The distortion zone is the area between the 
black and red lines. The size of this zone increases with the magnitude of 
the wealth disparity (𝛾). The distortion, measured by the distance between 
the black and red lines, increases as the impact of the policy (𝛼) increases. 
With a bigger policy change, the effect of wealth is larger. And the distor-
tion caused by wealth disparity is correspondingly larger. 
Some simple comparative statics can help to ascertain the size of the 
distortion caused by wealth disparity. We start by considering plausible 
values for the magnitude of the wealth disparity, 𝛾. Since the simple 
𝛿 






Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:503 2021 
522 
example includes only two representative individuals, A and B, with dif-
ferent levels of wealth, we let A represent an individual at the sixtieth per-
centile of wealth, and we let B represent an individual at the fortieth per-
centile of wealth. In the United States, this means that A’s wealth is 
~$170,000 or, measured relative to the median wealth of ~$100,000, 𝜔( =
1.7, and B’s wealth is ~$50,000 or, measured relative to the median wealth 
of ~$100,000, 𝜔) = 0.5.41 This implies:  
𝛾 = Qd
Qf
= 3.4.  
Using these parameter values, the following table presents the informational con-
tent (𝛿Z) and the distortion measure (1 𝛿Z⁄ ) for policy changes with different 
impact levels (i.e., with different 𝛼 values). 
 
𝛼 𝛿Z 1 𝛿Z⁄  
0.01 0.29 3.44 
0.1 0.27 3.70 
0.25 0.25 4.00 
0.5 0.20 5.00 
1 0.12 8.33 
1.5 0.08 12.5 
2 0.06 16.67 
 
Table 2(a). Distortion Caused by Wealth Disparity—Smaller  
Disparity 
(𝛾 = 3.4, 𝜔) = 0.5) 
 
We see that a WTP-based assessment for a smaller-impact policy such 
as 𝛼 = 0.01 will prescribe (or prefer) Policy A, even if it produces utility 
that is 3.44 smaller than Policy B. A WTP-based assessment for a larger-
impact policy such as 𝛼 = 2 will prescribe (or prefer) Policy A, even if it 
produces utility that is 16.67 times smaller than Policy B. 
What happens if we increase the wealth disparity? Let A represent an 
individual at the seventieth percentile of wealth, and let B represent an 
individual at the thirtieth percentile of wealth. In the United States, this 
means that A’s wealth is ~$280,000 or, measured relative to the median 
wealth of ~$100,000, 𝜔( = 2.8, and B’s wealth is ~$19,000 or, measured 




                                                                                                                                                                                
 41. The wealth figures are taken from PK, United States Net Worth Brackets, Percentiles, and 
Top One Percent, DON’T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB, https://dqydj.com/net-worth-brackets-wealth-brack-
ets-one-percent/ [https://perma.cc/X3UD-QSD9]. These figures are based on data from the Federal Re-
serve’s 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances. 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. 
SYS. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf_2016.htm [https://perma.cc/3DZ7-
QLDG].  
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Using these parameter values, the following table presents the informational con-
tent (𝛿Z) and the distortion measure (1 𝛿Z⁄ ) for policy changes with different 
impact levels (i.e., with different 𝛼 values). 
 
𝛼 𝛿Z 1 𝛿Z⁄  
0.01 0.07 14.29 
0.1 0.06 16.67 
0.25 0.04 25.00 
0.5 0.02 50.00 
1 0.01 100 
1.5 0.007 142.86 
2 0.005 200.00 
 
Table 2(b). Distortion Caused by Wealth Disparity—Larger  
Disparity  
(𝛾 = 14.7, 𝜔) = 0.19) 
 
We see that a WTP-based assessment for a smaller-impact policy such 
as 𝛼 = 0.01 will prescribe (or prefer) Policy A, even if it produces utility 
that is 14.29 smaller than Policy B. A WTP-based assessment for a larger-
impact policy such as 𝛼 = 2 will prescribe (or prefer) Policy A, even if it 
produces utility that is 200 times smaller than Policy B. As the wealth dis-
parity increases—moving from Table 2(a) (𝛾 = 3.4) to Table 2(b) (𝛾 =
14.7)—the magnitude of the distortion increases. The increase in the dis-
tortion is roughly proportional to the increase in wealth disparity for 
smaller-impact policies and more than proportional for larger-impact pol-
icies. 
3. A Wealth-Adjusted WTP 
I use the proposed analytical framework to quantify the distortion 
caused by wealth disparity. The same analytical framework can be used to 
correct for the wealth disparity, namely, to derive a wealth-adjusted WTP. 
Consider the poor Individual B, with wealth 𝜔), who is willing to pay 𝑚) 
for a policy that creates a benefit ∆𝑢). How much would an individual with 
median wealth pay for the same benefit? The WTP of the median individ-
ual can be thought of as a wealth-adjusted WTP.  
In our simple, two-person example, the median wealth is: 
𝜔. = 6
V
(𝜔( + 𝜔)) =
6
V
(1 + 𝛾)𝜔).  
Let 𝑚(𝜔.) denote the median individual’s WTP for a benefit ∆𝑢). We can 
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for policies or benefits of different magnitude, represented by the param-
eter 𝛼 (as in the preceding analysis). This ratio is derived in Section B of 










for different 𝛼 values. When the wealth disparity is smaller (𝛾 = 3.4		 and 
𝜔) = 0.5), the poor individual’s WTP needs to be multiplied by 2.2 to 2.64, 
depending on the impact or magnitude of the policy. When the wealth dis-
parity is larger (𝛾 = 14.7 and	𝜔) = 0.19), the poor individual’s WTP needs 










𝛾 = 3.4 and 𝜔) = 0.5 





𝛼 ≥ 1.05 2.64 
 
Table 3(a). Wealth Multipliers for WTP: Smaller Wealth Disparity 
 









𝛾 = 14.7 and 𝜔) = 0.19 





𝛼 ≥ 1.20 24.64 
 
Table 3(b). Wealth Multipliers for WTP: Larger Wealth Disparity 
 
We could apply a similar conversion to the WTP of the rich Individual 
A. By using these wealth-adjusted WTP figures, policymakers can avoid 
the distortion caused by wealth disparity. To calculate the wealth-adjusted 
WTP, policymakers need to know the wealth distribution and the impact 
or magnitude of the policies under consideration. 
B. Uniform, Average WTP 
Shifting from individualized WTP to average, uniform WTP avoids 
distortions in policymaking when it is used to assess universal benefits, like 
reduction in mortality risk, that provide a similar increase in utility for both 
the rich and the poor: ∆𝑢( = ∆𝑢) = ∆𝑢. Consider Policy A that reduces 
mortality risk for Individual A by a multiple 𝑎 > 0, such that ∆𝑢( = 𝑎∆𝑢, 
and Policy B that reduces mortality risk for Individual B by a multiple 𝑏 >
0, such that ∆𝑢) = 𝑏∆𝑢. For a reduction in mortality risk, ∆𝑢, a uniform 
WTP, 𝑚., is informative, and Policy B will be preferred if and only if 𝑏 > 𝑎. 
C. Summary 
When the considered policies are not paid for by the affected individ-
uals, the informational content of individualized WTP decreases as the de-
gree of wealth disparity increases. The individualized WTP distorts policy-
making in a particular direction, benefiting the rich at the expense of the 
poor. 
A uniform, average WTP has more informational content when the 
considered policies create universal benefits, like reduction in mortality 
risk. Moreover, in the important case of universal benefits, a uniform, av-
erage WTP can support progressive redistribution, independent of infor-
mational content. Consider a policy that saves many (statistical) lives of 
poor individuals but costs billions to implement. Using the poor 
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individuals’ WTP, the policymaker might conclude that the benefit does 
not justify the cost and reject the policy. Using the higher, average WTP, 
the same policy would be adopted. (Using the average WTP and adopting 
the policy is especially good for the poor if the implementation costs are 
paid for by general taxes and the poor pay less in taxes.) Now consider a 
policy that saves many (statistical) lives of rich individuals. Using the high 
WTP of the rich, the policy would be adopted, despite high implementation 
costs. The same policy might be rejected if we use the lower, average WTP. 
III. Policies that Are Paid for by the Affected Individuals 
I now consider policies that are paid for by the affected individuals. 
Section III.A focuses on individualized WTP and shows that this measure 
has high informational content. Section III.B focuses on uniform, average 
WTP, shows that this measure has lower informational content, and studies 
the relationship between informational content and wealth disparity. 
A. Individualized WTP 
When a policy creates a benefit paid for by the affected individual, 
individualized WTP perfectly balances benefit and cost. The poor are will-
ing to pay less than the rich for a policy that would create the same (or 
greater) utility because the poor have other, high-utility uses for the little 
money they have (e.g., paying rent and buying food). On the other hand, 
the rich have more money and lower utility uses for their marginal dollars 
(think of a billionaire buying yet another yacht). WTP thus balances the 
utility created by the policy (the benefit side) against the utility from alter-
native uses (the cost side). Since both benefits and costs are important, 
WTP is normatively appealing. In some sense, the poor really want the pol-
icy less than the rich. WTP is normatively appealing when the cost of im-
plementing the policies is borne by the individuals who are affected by the 
policy. In this case, it makes sense to adopt a policy that affects the rich and 
reject an equal-benefit policy that affects the poor. The individualized 
WTP is informative. 
B. Uniform, Average WTP 
1. Wealth Disparity and Informational Content 
When policies are paid for by the affected individuals, a uniform, av-
erage WTP, like the VSL, has low informational content. It distorts policy 
choice, and this distortion increases with the degree of wealth disparity. I 
quantify these distortions by showing how greater wealth disparity in-
creases the range of welfare-reducing policies that would be adopted if av-
erage WTP were used.  
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I consider two policies: Policy A, which creates a benefit ∆𝑢 and re-
duces mortality risk for the rich Individual A, and Policy B, which creates 
an equivalent benefit ∆𝑢 for the poor Individual B. There are two types of 
distortion42:  








− 1,  









If Individual A and Individual B have the same wealth, 𝜔( = 𝜔), then 
𝑚. = 𝑚( = 𝑚), and there are no distortions (𝐷) = 𝐷( = 0). As the wealth 
disparity increases, the distortion increases. The relationship between the 
degree of wealth disparity (𝛾) and the distortions (𝐷)  and 𝐷() is summa-
rized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: The distortions 𝑫𝑩 and 𝑫𝑨 are increasing in the de-
gree of wealth disparity, 𝜸. Therefore, a less equal wealth distribution 
reduces the informational content of WTP. 
 



















> 0. QED. 
2. Example 
I use a variation on the example from Section II.A.2. For concrete-
ness, consider the benefit from a reduction in mortality risk. Let ∆𝑢 =
𝛼𝑣(𝜔)) with 𝛼 ≥ 0 denote this benefit, which is assumed to be independent 
of wealth. A higher 𝛼 represents policies with bigger impact, or policies 
that create a larger reduction in mortality risk. Individualized WTP 
measures, 𝑚( for Individual A and 𝑚) for Individual B, are derived as be-
fore. Here, the utility change, ∆𝑢, is identical for both parties, but the 
wealth disparity still results in different individualized WTP values.  
a. Welfare-Reducing Adoption of Policy B 
Policy B should be adopted when the cost, which is also the price that 
Individual B will pay (e.g., for the safer product), is smaller than 𝑚). If a 
uniform, average WTP is used, then Policy B will be adopted when the cost 
is smaller than 𝑚. (which is larger than 𝑚)). The magnitude, in percentage 
terms, of the distortion is: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 42. See equations (4) and (5) supra Part I. 






Plugging in the expressions for 𝑚) and 𝑚., which are derived in Sec-














2 (𝛾 − 1)𝜔)
𝜔) − 0.135
, 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼(
1
2 [𝛾𝜔)(1 − 𝑒
UVt) − (𝜔) − 0.135)]
𝜔) − 0.135
, 𝛼) ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛼(
1
2
(𝛾 − 1) , 𝛼 < 𝛼)
 (7) 
 
where 𝛼) ≡ 1 + mn ln𝜔), and 𝛼( ≡ 1 +
m
n ln 𝛾𝜔). 























Figure 2. Type 1 Distortion, 𝐷) , as a Function of 𝛼 
 
We see that the distortion is (weakly) increasing in the magnitude of 
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important, we see that the distortion increases as the degree of wealth dis-
parity, 𝛾, increases. 
Some simple comparative statics can help to ascertain the size of the 
distortion caused by wealth disparity. As before, let 𝜔) = 0.5 and  
𝛾 = Qd
Qf
= 3.4.  
Let us consider policy changes with different impact levels (i.e., with dif-
ferent 𝛼 values). For small-impact policies, with 
 𝛼 < 1 + mn ln𝜔) = 0.65,  
the distortion is 
 𝐷 = 6
V
(𝛾 − 1) = 1.2.  
Individual B would be forced to pay twenty percent more than he is willing 
to pay for this benefit. For large-impact policies, with 
 𝛼 > 1 + mn ln𝛾𝜔) = 1.27,  
the distortion is: 
 𝐷 = 6
V
(𝛾 − 1) Qf
QfUn
= 1.64.  
Individual B would be forced to pay sixty-four percent more than he is 
willing to pay for this benefit. For intermediate-impact policies, the distor-
tion would be between twenty and sixty-four percent. 




= 14.7?  
For small-impact policies, with 
𝛼 < 1 + mn ln𝜔) = 0.17,  
the distortion is: 
𝐷 = 6
V
(𝛾 − 1) = 6.85, 
namely, Individual B would be forced to pay 6.85 times as much as the 
benefit is actually worth to him, a distortion of 585%. For large-impact pol-
icies, with 
𝛼 > 1 + mn ln𝛾𝜔) = 1.51,  
the distortion is: 
𝐷 = 6
V
(𝛾 − 1) Qf
QfUn
= 9.38,  
namely, Individual B would be forced to pay 9.38 times as much as the 
benefit is actually worth to him, a distortion of 838%. For intermediate-
impact policies, the distortion would be between 585% and 838%. 
b. Welfare-Reducing Failure to Adopt Policy A 
Policy A should be adopted when the cost, which is also the price that 
Individual A will pay (e.g., for the safer product), is smaller than 𝑚(. If a 
uniform, average WTP is used, then Policy A will be adopted when the cost 
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is smaller than 𝑚. (which is smaller than 𝑚(). The magnitude, in percentage 





We can derive expressions for 𝑚( and 𝑚. and quantify the distortion 
caused by the failure to adopt Policy A as we did with the distortion caused 
by welfare-reducing adoption of Policy B. The analysis is very similar and 
is, therefore, omitted. 
C. Summary 
When the considered policies are paid for by the affected individuals, 
individualized WTP has high informational content. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that this high informational content does not prevent individualized 
WTP from increasing wealth disparity. There are a range of expensive pol-
icies that will be adopted when they benefit the rich, but not when they 
benefit the poor. These policies will further advantage the rich relative to 
the poor. A uniform, average WTP has lower informational content, and 
its informational content decreases as the degree of wealth disparity in-
creases. The uniform, average WTP harms both the rich and the poor, re-
sulting in ambiguous distributional implications. 
IV. Time and Rationality 
A. Time 
Thus far, we have considered a static, one-period framework. We now 
consider a dynamic extension with multiple time periods. Utilities, social 
welfare, and wealth change over time as new policies are adopted. Let 𝑢;  
denote the utility of individual i at time t. Let 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝑢6 , 𝑢V , … , 𝑢 ) de-
note social welfare at time t. And let 𝜔. = (𝜔6 , 𝜔V , … ,𝜔 ) denote the vec-
tor of wealth values at time t. Given the initial wealth distribution, 𝜔.5, a 
WTP-based analysis conducted at 𝑡 = 1 leads to the adoption of policy 𝑃6. 
Policy 𝑃6 then changes the wealth distribution to 𝜔.6. With 𝜔.6, a WTP-
based analysis conducted at 𝑡 = 2 leads to the adoption of policy 𝑃V. Policy 
𝑃V then changes the wealth distribution to 𝜔.V. And so on. 
A standard critique of WTP-based policymaking is that the chosen 
policy depends on the initial distribution of wealth. The dynamic extension 
strengthens this critique. The initial wealth distribution affects not only the 
current policy choice but also many future policy choices. If the initial 
wealth distribution, 𝜔.5, is even slightly unequal, this inequality might result 
in a policy 𝑃6 that slightly increases this inequality. The more skewed 
wealth distribution, 𝜔.6, might result in a policy 𝑃V that further increases 
inequality. And so on. Through this dynamic, inequality can increase over 
time. 
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Related, and perhaps even more interesting, is the effect of such pol-
icy dynamics on the initial WTP-based analysis and thus on the initial pol-
icy decision. Since the initial policy will affect, through the evolving wealth 
distribution, many future policies, the stakes are higher, and thus WTP for 
the initial policy will be higher. Indeed, individuals would borrow against 
future wealth to increase WTP and secure their favored (initial) policy. 
Moreover, the individual’s 𝑡 = 0 wealth, properly understood, incorpo-
rates—in a net-present-value sense—anticipated future changes in her 
wealth, at least to the extent that the individual can borrow against her 
future wealth. Thus, even if two individuals start off with identical wealth, 
the possibility that successive policy choices could benefit one individual 
more than the other implies that wealth disparity might already distort the 
initial, 𝑡 = 0 policy choice. The dynamic extension suggests additional con-
cerns about WTP-based policymaking. 
B. Rationality 
The preceding discussion assumed that individuals are rational in the 
sense that they anticipate the consequences of the policy change and adjust 
their WTP accordingly. But some individuals might not be able to antici-
pate all possible consequences of a policy change and how it affects their 
utility going forward. And, even if they anticipate these consequences, im-
perfectly rational individuals might struggle to translate them into a WTP. 
It is not surprising that such deviations from perfect rationality can skew 
WTP-based policymaking and any other type of policymaking. Still, there 
are several specific implications of imperfect rationality that should be 
noted. 
Start with the static framework and consider the standard WTP ques-
tion: “how much are you willing to pay for a Policy X?” This question elic-
its a response that is sensitive to the immediate effect of the policy change, 
for example, “I think that rearview cameras should be added to cars, and I 
would be willing to pay an extra $X for a car with a rearview camera.” But 
what about the distributional effects of the policy? For example, a rule that 
requires rearview cameras in all cars would increase the price of cars, thus 
harming poorer individuals disproportionately. All car buyers would pay 
more, but the same price increase would have a larger effect on the poor. 
Or the policy may have no effect at all on the rich if the high-end cars that 
the rich buy were already equipped with rearview cameras (voluntarily, 
before the policy change mandated this feature). While a rational individ-
ual would consider these broader, distributional effects when stating a 
WTP for the policy, an imperfectly rational individual might not. 
The rationality assumption becomes even more unrealistic in the dy-
namic extension. Now, beyond the immediate effect of the policy and its 
distributional consequences, the individual would need to anticipate a pro-
gression of policy changes that would be triggered by the initial policy 
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choice and the greater distributional consequences of this progression. A 
perfectly rational individual would state a WTP that incorporates these 
long-term effects. An imperfectly rational, or myopic, individual will not.  
It is not hard to imagine how imperfect rationality could distort WTP-
based policymaking. For example, consider a choice between policy 𝑃6( 
and policy 𝑃6). If 𝑃6( is adopted, then 𝑃V(, 𝑃(, etc. will follow; this will 
result in a direct increase in Individual A’s utility and will also enrich Indi-
vidual A. If 𝑃6) is adopted, then 𝑃V), 𝑃), etc. will follow; this will result in 
a direct increase in Individual B’s utility and will also enrich Individual B. 
Now assume that the parties are differentially rational, such that Individual 
A fully anticipates the dynamic effects of choosing policy 𝑃6(, whereas In-
dividual B is myopic and considers only the immediate effects of policy 
𝑃6). In this example, a WTP-based assessment might lead to the adoption 
of policy 𝑃6(, even though 𝑃6), 𝑃V), 𝑃), etc. would result in greater social 
welfare. The question of rationality raises additional concerns about WTP-
based policymaking.43 
Conclusion 
This Essay offered a welfarist reassessment of WTP-based policymak-
ing. Most fundamentally, WTP-based assessments are justified in a welfar-
ist framework to the extent that WTP provides information about individ-
ual preferences. The preceding analysis suggested potentially significant 
limits on the informational content of WTP, especially in a society with 
large wealth disparity. It also quantified the distortions that result when 
policymakers use a WTP measure with low informational content. The in-
formational content of WTP depends on the policymaking context and on 
the specific WTP measure that is applied. The results in this Essay can help 
policymakers identify the best WTP measure for the policy choice that they 
face. In some scenarios, WTP is quite attractive. In others, the shortcom-
ings of WTP-based policymaking are significant, and they should be con-
sidered by policymakers before they use WTP to guide their policy choices. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 43. Indeed, the challenges that imperfect rationality poses for WTP-based policymaking 
go beyond those outlined here. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 403, 411, 427-28. 
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Appendix 
Section A of this Appendix develops the example from Section II.A.2 
using the functional form 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 ln𝜔. Using the same example, Section 
B derives the wealth-adjusted WTP for the Section II.A.3 analysis. Section 
C develops another example using the alternative functional form 𝑣(𝜔) =
√𝜔. Section D develops the example from Section III.B.2 using the func-
tional form 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 ln𝜔. 
A. Section II.A.2: 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝜔—Individualized WTP 
We follow Layard et al. who use and justify the functional form 
𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 ln𝜔 as a first approximation. Based on happiness data summa-




Following Layard et al., we interpret 𝜔 as an individual’s wealth rela-
tive to the median wealth level in the population. For example, 𝜔 = 1 rep-
resents an individual with a level of wealth that is equal to the median 
wealth level in the population, and 𝜔 = 0.5 represents an individual with a 
level of wealth that is half of the median wealth level in the population. 
Correspondingly, the utility of the individual with the median wealth level 
in the population is normalized to zero, i.e.: 
𝑣(1) = 6
V
ln1 = 0. 
We assume, without loss of generality, that A is richer than B and let 
𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔), with 𝛾 > 1. We measure the utilities from the policy change in 
relation to the difference between the utility of a person with average 
wealth (𝜔 = 1) and the utility of a person with subsistence wealth, which 
we set at 13.5% of the average wealth (𝜔 = 𝑒UV ≈ 0.135). Specifically, for 
individual B, we have: 
∆𝑢) = 𝛼Wmn ln 1 −
m
n ln 0.135X = 𝛼 where 𝛼 ≥ 0,  
and for Individual A, we have ∆𝑢( = 𝛿∆𝑢) where 𝛿 ≥ 0. Or, substituting 
∆𝑢) = 𝛼, we have ∆𝑢( = 𝛿𝛼. 
Now consider the parties’ WTP. We measure WTP, m, as a percent of 
the average wealth level, so that it can be easily compared to the wealth 
percentile (𝜔) as defined above. We assume that an individual will not pay 
an amount that would leave this individual with less than subsistence level 
wealth. (The subsistence level assumption avoids the technical difficulties 
of dealing with a logarithm of zero.) This implies 𝜔 −𝑚 ≥ 0.135. Substi-
tuting into the equation: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 44. The median 𝛽 in Table 3 of Layard et al., supra note 37, is 0.57. More fundamentally, 
several assumptions about the relationship between income and happiness and between happiness 
and utility are necessary to justify the functional form 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 ln𝜔 (including cardinal utility, 
utility that is comparable across individuals, subjective well-being [or happiness] as a measure of 
utility, etc.). See Layard et al. for a discussion of these assumptions and their justification. 






ln(𝜔 −𝑚) ≤ ∆𝑢,  
we get a corner solution of 𝑚 = 𝜔 − 0.135 whenever 
6
V
ln𝜔 + 1 ≤ ∆𝑢. 
For Individual B, we have  
 
𝑚) = 
𝜔) − 0.135 ,
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1 ≤ ∆𝑢)
𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UV∆Pf) ,
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1 > ∆𝑢)
 (8) 
 
And, after substituting ∆𝑢) = 𝛼, we have 
 
𝑚) = 
𝜔) − 0.135 , 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼
𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt) , 𝛼 < 𝛼
 (9) 
 
where 𝛼 ≡ 1 + mn ln𝜔). (Note that 𝜔) > 0.135 implies 𝛼 > 0.) 
For Individual A, we have  
 
𝑚( = 
𝜔( − 0.135 ,
1
2 ln𝜔( + 1 ≤ ∆𝑢(
𝜔((1 − 𝑒UV∆Pd) ,
1
2 ln𝜔( + 1 > ∆𝑢(
 (10) 
 
And, after substituting 𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔) and ∆𝑢( = 𝛿𝛼, we have 
 
𝑚( = 
𝛾𝜔) − 0.135 , 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿Z(	𝑜𝑟	𝛿𝛼 ≥ 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾)
𝛾𝜔)W1 − 𝑒UVetX , 𝛿 < 𝛿Z(	𝑜𝑟	𝛿𝛼 < 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾)
 (11) 
 












ln𝛾𝜔) 𝑒V). (Note that 𝜔) > 0.135 and 𝛾 > 1 imply 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾) >
0 and 𝛿Z( > 0.) 
Policy A will be chosen if and only if 𝑚( > 𝑚). There are four ranges: 
(1) 𝛼 < 𝛼 and 𝛼𝛿 < 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾), (2) 𝛼 > 𝛼 and 𝛼𝛿 < 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾), (3) 𝛼 < 𝛼 and 
𝛼𝛿 > 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾), and (4) 𝛼 > 𝛼 and 𝛼𝛿 > 𝑘(𝜔), 𝛾). For range (1), Policy A 





. (Note that 𝛿Z6(𝛼) < 𝛿Z(.) For range (2), Policy A will be 
chosen if and only if 𝛾𝜔)W1 − 𝑒UVetX > 𝜔) − 0.135, or 𝛿 > 𝛿ZV =






. (Note that 𝛿ZV(𝛼) < 𝛿Z(.)	For range (3), Policy A will be 
chosen if and only if 𝛾𝜔) − 0.135 > 𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt), which is always true 
(since 𝜔) − 0.135 > 𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt) and 𝛾 > 1 by assumption).	For range 
(4), Policy A will be chosen if and only if 𝛾𝜔) − 0.135 > 𝜔) − 0.135,  or 
𝛾 > 1, which is always true (by assumption). 
These results are summarized in the following observations: When 
𝛼 < 𝛼, Policy A will be chosen if and only if  






When 𝛼 > 𝛼, Policy A will be chosen if and only if 






















< 0, 𝛿Z6(𝛼) = 𝛿ZV(𝛼), 
and lim
t→ 
𝛿ZV = 0. 
B. Section II.A.3: 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝜔—Wealth-Adjusted WTP 
Focusing on a policy with benefit ∆𝑢) = 𝛼, the WTP of the median-
wealth individual is 
 
𝑚(𝜔.) = 
𝜔. − 0.135 ,
1
2 ln𝜔. + 1 ≤ 𝛼
𝜔.(1 − 𝑒UVt) ,
1
2 ln𝜔. + 1 > 𝛼
 (12) 
 
Substituting 𝜔. = 6
V












(1 + 𝛾) , 𝛼 ≤
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1
𝜔.(1 − 𝑒UVt)
𝜔) − 0.135
, 𝛼 ∈ _
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1,
1
2 ln𝜔. + 1`
1




2 ln𝜔. + 1
	 (13) 
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C. Section II.A.2: 𝑣(𝜔) = √𝜔—Individualized WTP 
Substituting 𝑣(𝜔) = √𝜔 into equation (1), we have ¡𝜔; − ¡𝜔; −𝑚; =
∆𝑢;. Solving for 𝑚;, we obtain 
 
𝑚; = 𝑚𝑖𝑛W∆𝑢;W2¡𝜔; − ∆𝑢;X, 𝜔;X (14) 
 
The min operator captures the wealth constraint: The individual 
would never be able to pay more than 𝜔;. (Note that, in contrast with the 
subsistence level assumption from the previous example, we assume the 
WTP is constrained only by the individual’s wealth, 𝜔;, such that the indi-
vidual can be left with zero.) 
We have two ranges: (1) if ¡𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢; (or 𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢;V), then 𝑚; = 𝜔; 
and (2) if ¡𝜔; > ∆𝑢; (or 𝜔; > ∆𝑢;V), then 𝑚; = ∆𝑢;W2¡𝜔; − ∆𝑢;X. For 
range (1), if the utility from the policy change exceeds the utility obtained 
when the individual’s wealth is spent entirely on the numeraire good, the 
individual would be willing to pay her entire wealth for the policy change. 
When wealth is small relative to the magnitude of the policy change, i.e., 
when ¡𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢;, or 𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢;V, the effect of wealth on WTP is 
RNO
RQO
= 1 > 0.  
For range (2), if the utility from the policy change is smaller than the 
utility obtained when the individual’s wealth is spent entirely on the nu-
meraire good, the individual would be willing to pay ∆𝑢;W2¡𝜔; − ∆𝑢;X <
𝜔; for the policy change. When wealth is larger relative to the magnitude 
of the policy change, i.e., when ¡𝜔; > ∆𝑢;, or 𝜔; > ∆𝑢;V, the effect of 





> 0.  




We can now consider the informational content of WTP. Starting with 




we make the following observations: when wealth is small relative to the 
magnitude of the policy change, or when ¡𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢; (or 𝜔; ≤ ∆𝑢;V), WTP 




= 0).  
When wealth is larger relative to the magnitude of the policy change, or 
when 
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 ¡𝜔; > ∆𝑢; (or 𝜔; > ∆𝑢;V),  
the informational content of WTP is 
 	 RNO
R∆PO
= 2W¡𝜔; − ∆𝑢;X > 0.  
The informational content of WTP increases as wealth increases. 
When a person is richer, the utility that she obtains from the last units of 
the numeraire good is small. Therefore, for any increase in the value of the 
policy change, she would be willing to give up more units of the numeraire 
good.45 
Next, consider the second measure of informational content. Consider 
Policy A, which affects Individual A, and Policy B, which affects Individual 
B. Policy A increases Individual A’s utility by ∆𝑢(, and Policy B increases 
Individual B’s utility by ∆𝑢). If Individual A and Individual B have the 
same wealth, 𝜔( = 𝜔), then A’s WTP will exceed B’s WTP (i.e., 𝑚( > 𝑚) 
if and only if ∆𝑢( > ∆𝑢)). However, the greater the wealth disparity, the 
more likely it is that 𝑚( > 𝑚), even though ∆𝑢( < ∆𝑢).  
We next attempt to quantify this distortion. We assume, without loss 
of generality, that A is richer than B and let 𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔) with 𝛾 > 1. We 
measure the utilities from the policy change in relation to the utility that 
Individual B would have received had she spent her entire wealth on the 
numeraire good. Specifically, we have ∆𝑢) = 𝛼𝑣(𝜔)) = 𝛼√𝜔) where 𝛼 ≥
0. And, for Individual A, we have ∆𝑢( = 𝛿∆𝑢) where 𝛿 ≥ 0. Or, substitut-
ing ∆𝑢) = 𝛼√𝜔), we have ∆𝑢( = 𝛿𝛼√𝜔). 
Now consider the parties’ WTP. For Individual B, we have  
𝑚) = 
𝜔) , ¡𝜔) ≤ ∆𝑢)
∆𝑢)W2¡𝜔) − ∆𝑢)X , ¡𝜔) > ∆𝑢)
 (16) 
 And, after substituting ∆𝑢) = 𝛼√𝜔), we have 
𝑚) = 
𝜔) , 𝛼 ≥ 1
𝛼(2 − 𝛼)𝜔) , 𝛼 < 1
 (17) 
 For Individual A, we have  
𝑚( = 
𝜔( , ¡𝜔( ≤ ∆𝑢(
∆𝑢(W2¡𝜔( − ∆𝑢(X , ¡𝜔( > ∆𝑢(
 (18) 
 And, after substituting 𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔) and ∆𝑢( = 𝛿𝛼√𝜔), we have 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                

















The informational content of WTP increases as the individual’s wealth increases. 





⎧ 𝛾𝜔) , 𝛼 ≥
√𝛾
𝛿




Policy A will be chosen if and only if 𝑚( > 𝑚).  
It is helpful to distinguish between two scenarios based on the magni-
tude of the policy change. 
 
Scenario 1: Smaller Policy Changes (i.e., 𝜶 < 𝟏) 
There are three ranges for this scenario: (1) 𝛿 < √𝛾 < √
h
t
 (or 𝛼 < 1 <
√h
e
), (2) √𝛾 < 𝛿 < √
h
t
 (or 𝛼 < √h
e
< 1), and (3) √𝛾 < √
h
t
< 𝛿 (or √h
e
< 𝛼 < 1). 
In range (1), Policy A will be chosen if and only if 𝛿𝛼(2√𝛾 − 𝛿𝛼) >
𝛼(2 − 𝛼).	In range (2), Policy A will be chosen if and only if 
𝛿𝛼(2√𝛾 − 𝛿𝛼) > 𝛼(2 − 𝛼). In range (3), Policy A will be chosen if and only 
if 𝛾 > 𝛼(2 − 𝛼), which is always true (since 𝛼(2 − 𝛼) < 1 for all 𝛼, and 𝛾 >
1 by assumption). 
 
Scenario 2: Larger Policy Changes (i.e., 𝜶 > 𝟏) 
There are three ranges: (1) 𝛿 < √h
t






√𝛾 (or 1 < √
h
e
< 𝛼), and (3) √h
t
< √𝛾 < 𝛿 (or √
h
e
< 1 < 𝛼). In range (1), Pol-
icy A will be chosen if and only if 𝛿𝛼(2√𝛾 − 𝛿𝛼) > 1.	In range (2), Policy 
A will be chosen if and only if 𝛾𝜔) > 𝜔) or 𝛾 > 1, which is always true (by 
assumption). In range (3), Policy A will be chosen if and only if 𝛾𝜔) > 𝜔) 
or 𝛾 > 1, which is always true (by assumption). 
 
In both scenarios, there is a threshold value, 𝛿Z, such that Policy A will 
be chosen when 𝛿 > 𝛿Z, and Policy B will be chosen when 𝛿 < 𝛿Z. In Scenario 
1, the threshold, which will be denoted 𝛿Z6, solves the equation  






(The equation that defines the threshold 𝛿Z6 appears in ranges (1) and (2); 
in range (3), 𝛿 is always above 𝛿Z6, and Policy A will always be chosen.) In 
Scenario 2, the threshold, which will be denoted 𝛿ZV, solves the equation  






(The equation that defines the threshold 𝛿ZV appears in range (1); in ranges 
(2) and (3), 𝛿 is always above 𝛿ZV, and Policy A will always be chosen.) 
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These results are summarized in the following observations: In Sce-
nario 1, Policy A will be chosen if and only if 






In Scenario 2, Policy A will be chosen if and only if 






















< 0, 𝛿Z6(𝛼 = 1) =
𝛿ZV(𝛼 = 1) = √𝛾 −¡𝛾 − 1, and limt→ 𝛿
ZV = 0. 









¡𝛾 − 𝛼(2 − 𝛼)





𝛼 , 𝛼 ≥ 1
 (20) 
 In Figure A1 (below), we graph the threshold 𝛿Z as a function of 𝛼 (the 


















Figure A1. The Threshold 𝛿Z as a Function of 𝛼; 𝑣(𝜔) = √𝜔 
 
Policy A should be chosen in the area above the red line (i.e., when 
𝛿 > 1). With WTP-based policymaking, Policy A will be chosen in the area 
above the black line (when 𝛿 > 𝛿Z6 [if 𝛼 < 1] or 𝛿 > 𝛿ZV [if 𝛼 > 1]). The dis-
tortion zone is the area between the black and red lines. The size of this 





¡𝛾 𝛾¥  
¡𝛾 − ¡𝛾 − 1 
1 
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size of the distortion also increases as the impact of the policy (𝛼) increases. 
With a bigger policy change, the effect of wealth is larger,46 and the distor-
tion caused by wealth disparity is correspondingly larger. 
Some simple comparative statics can help ascertain the size of the dis-
tortion caused by wealth disparity. We start by considering plausible values 
for the magnitude of the wealth disparity, 𝛾. Since the simple example in-
cludes only two representative individuals, A and B, with different levels 
of wealth, let us divide the U.S. population into two groups: the top fifty 
percent and the bottom fifty percent in terms of wealth (net worth). The 
median household in the “top” group, or the household in the seventy-fifth 
percentile, has wealth of 𝜔( = ~$400,000. The median household in the 
“bottom” group, or the household in the twenty-fifth percentile, has wealth 












Let us consider policy changes with different impact levels (i.e., with 
different 𝛼 values). The results are summarized in the following table. 
 
𝛼 𝛿Z 1 − 𝛿Z 1 𝛿Z⁄  
0.01 0.16 0.84 6.25 
0.25 0.14 0.86 7.14 
0.5 0.12 0.88 8.33 
1 0.08 0.92 12.5 
1.5 0.05 0.95 20 
2 0.04 0.96 25 
 
Table A1. 𝛾 = 40 
 
Focusing on the fourth column in Table A1, we see that for a smaller-
impact policy (e.g., 𝛼 = 0.01), a WTP-based assessment will prescribe Pol-
icy A, even if it produces utility that is 6.25 times smaller than Policy B. For 
a larger-impact policy (e.g., 𝛼 = 2), a WTP-based assessment will prescribe 
Policy A, even if it produces utility that is twenty-five times smaller than 
Policy B. 
What if we had a much smaller wealth disparity represented by 𝛾 = 4 












Table A2 reports comparative statics for policy changes with different 
impact levels (i.e., with different 𝛼 values). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 46. For example, WTP for a house is more sensitive to wealth than WTP for a pencil. At 
the extreme, we fall in the 𝑣(𝜔;) < ∆𝑢; range where the individual would use all of her wealth to 
pay for the policy. In this range, WTP is determined solely by the individual’s wealth. 
 47. See supra note 41. 
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𝛼 𝛿Z 1 − 𝛿Z 1 𝛿Z⁄  
0.01 0.5 0.5 2 
0.25 0.45 0.55 2.22 
0.5 0.39 0.61 2.56 
1 0.27 0.73 3.7 
1.5 0.18 0.82 5.56 
2 0.13 0.87 7.69 
 
Table A2. 𝛾 = 4 
 
Focusing on the fourth column in Table A2, we see that for a smaller-
impact policy (e.g., 𝛼 = 0.01), a WTP-based assessment will prescribe Pol-
icy A, even if it produces utility that is two times smaller than Policy B. For 
a larger-impact policy (e.g., 𝛼 = 2), a WTP-based assessment will prescribe 
Policy A, even if it produces utility that is 7.69 times smaller than Policy B. 
D. Section III.B.2: 𝑣(𝜔) = 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝜔—Uniform, Average WTP 
For Individual B, we have  
 
𝑚) = 
𝜔) − 0.135 ,
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1 ≤ ∆𝑢
𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UV∆P) ,
1
2 ln𝜔) + 1 > ∆𝑢
 (21) 
 
And, after substituting ∆𝑢 = 𝛼, we have 
 
𝑚) = 
𝜔) − 0.135 , 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼)
𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt) , 𝛼 < 𝛼)
 (22) 
 
where 𝛼) ≡ 1 + mn ln𝜔). (Note that 𝜔) > 0.135 implies 𝛼) > 0.) 
For Individual A, we have  
 
𝑚( = 
𝜔( − 0.135 ,
1
2 ln𝜔( + 1 ≤ ∆𝑢
𝜔((1 − 𝑒UV∆P) ,
1
2 ln𝜔( + 1 > ∆𝑢
 (23) 
 
And, after substituting ∆𝑢 = 𝛼 and 𝜔( = 𝛾𝜔), we have 
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𝑚( = 
𝛾𝜔) − 0.135 , 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼(
𝛾𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt) , 𝛼 < 𝛼(
 (24) 
 
where 𝛼( ≡ 1+ mn ln 𝛾𝜔). (Note that 𝜔) > 0.135 and 𝛾 > 1 imply 𝛼( > 0.)  













(1 + 𝛾)𝜔) − 0.135 , 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼(
1
2
[𝜔) − 0.135 + 𝛾𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt)] , 𝛼) ≤ 𝛼 < 𝛼(
1
2
(1 + 𝛾)𝜔)(1 − 𝑒UVt) , 𝛼 < 𝛼)
 
(25) 
 
